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Theoretical Foundation and Rationale of the Study 
 
The literature of schema-based learning theories describes three types of learning: 
accretion, tuning and cognitive restructuring (Rumelhart & Norman, 1976). Research conducted 
in the area of cognitive restructuring generally is assembled under the heading of conceptual 
change. The literature tells us that it is very difficult to achieve conceptual change and may 
account for difficulties reported in learning some important science concepts such as electricity 
in physics (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; White, 1993), gas laws and equilibrium in chemistry 
(Wilson, 1998), and in the biological sciences such concepts as diffusion, osmosis (Odom, 1995; 
Settlage, 1994), and evolution (Anderson & Bishop 1986; Brumby, 1984; Jacobson & 
Archodidou, 2000). 
A traditional method used to facilitate conceptual change has been to provide the learner 
with examples that contradict their “naïve theories”, this is referred to as anomalous data 
approach. However, such studies have produced unequivocal results (e.g., Limón, 2001). Chinn 
and Brewer (1993) propose that the crux of the problem is the learner’s efforts to coordinate 
theory and data. These authors offer four characteristics that may account for the different 
responses to anomalous data: (1) entrenchment of prior theory; (2) ontological beliefs; (3) 
epistemological commitments; and, (4) background knowledge. 
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Chinn and Brewer (1993) also tell us that in the case of robust misconceptions, these four 
characteristics may not play an equal role. Intuitive “naïve” beliefs about the nature of existence 
and the fundamental categories and properties of the world (ontological beliefs), and beliefs 
about knowledge and how it is acquired (epistemological beliefs), may be deeply intertwined 
with who we are, as well as how and what we can learn. Chi, Slotta, and deLeeuw (1994), Strike 
and Posner, (1992), and Vosniadou (1994) support this point-of-view and categorize the problem 
of robust misconceptions as stemming from these fundamental beliefs or "theories" held about 
the properties of the concept. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
This study took as its starting point the conceptual change theory proposed by Chi and 
her colleagues (Chi et al., 1994; Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Slotta & Chi, 1999). The basic assumption 
of their theory is that all conceptions are classified into ontological categories — ordered 
hierarchical trees of super-ordinate and subordinate systems — based on attributes that are 
perceived or suggested to the learner. These schema-like associations act as facilitators or 
inhibitors of future transfer of knowledge and are part of general accretion and tuning. One 
approach to overcoming such limiting habits may involve the reassignment of concepts from the 
“clockwork” explanation of causality (often held by novice learners) to a scientifically correct 
“emergent” causal explanation (Chi et al, 1994; Chi & Roscoe, 2002). We wished to explore this 
theoretical position of achieving conceptual change and improving the understanding of 
particular science concepts (i.e., evolution) by providing the learner with the alternative 
emergent causal explanatory framework. 
If we were to accept this approach to conceptual change, then we needed to address the 
question of: how do we provide learners with an awareness of emergence1 and emergent 
causation? The literature related to teaching about “complex systems” provided one possible 
answer. “In the minds of many, the study of complexity is not just a new science, but a new way 
                                                 
1 Emergence, is defined as: a phenomenon which relies on the interactions of multiple agents, all operating under 
the same constraints (rules) without centralized control, yet affected by probabilistic causes and feedback loops that 
generate nonlinear effects creating dynamic self-organizing systems behaviors.  
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of thinking about all science, a fundamental shift from the paradigms that have dominated 
scientific thinking for the past 300 years” (Resnick & Wilensky, 1997, p. 4). Initial studies 
conducted by Resnick (1994) and Wilensky (1995) tell us that the use of particular types of 
simulations can offer an understanding of specific aspects of complexity – knowledge of the 
process of emergence and the subsequent development of non-isomorphic levels of organization. 
They have demonstrated that the use of StarLogo™ simulations is a powerful means of 
facilitating the acquisition of knowledge about complex systems, and accompanying emergent 
processes. However, other literature on complex systems thinking also reveals that students have 
great difficulties acquiring this understanding of “emergent causal processes” (e.g., Duit, 1998; 
Jacobson, 2000; Penner, 2000). Therefore we also explored the potential of these simulations to 
provide support (often referred to as “affordances”) for acquiring an emergent causal explanatory 
framework. Specifically, we examined which aspects of the five identified components of 
complex systems thinking (i.e., non-isomorphic multiple levels of organization, decentralized 
control, randomness, nonlinearity, probabilistic behavior, and dynamic homeostatic behaviors) 
were most difficult for the learners to acquire.  
Lastly, this study reflects on the appropriateness and “learnability” of the topic of 
complex systems for students at this educational level. For instances, Boyd (1997) suggests that 
it is possible to introduce elements of “cybersystemics” (i.e., elements of complex systems 
thinking) into the regular curriculum. Others such as Auyang (1997), Bar-Yam (1997), Kaput, 
Bar-Yam, and Jacobson (1999) contend that complex systems may function as a unifying and 
cross-disciplinary theme. In the most recent New England Complex Systems Institute annual 
conference, Jacobson, Jakobsson, Lemke, and Wilensky (2002) challenged the science education 
community to explore the potential of using complex systems ideas in the classroom. They 
stated: “the conceptual basis of complex systems ideas reflects a change in perspective about our 
world that is important for students to develop, as it corresponds to the scientific environment 
that will exist when they graduate. This perspective emphasizes both the limits of predictability 
as well as the possibility of understanding indirect consequences of actions taken, both positive 
and negative, through modeling the interdependence of our world” (p.2). Therefore we provide 
some insights into this possibility. 
Research Questions and Methods 
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1. Do student’s explanatory frameworks of scientific phenomena (ontological beliefs) change as 
a consequence of an instructional intervention utilizing simulations of complex systems (i.e., 
StarLogo) and supported by cognitive scaffolding? 
2. What Complex Systems concepts do students acquire during the instructional activities? 
3. What is the development of students’ systems thinking? 
 
The study was a mixed method qualitative case study design which engaged the 
theoretical sampling strategy of “purposeful” sampling (Creswell 2002) to select nine cases. 
Hence, the participants were selected basis on their ability to help the researchers understand this 
learning process (all first year Cegep science students). 
The experimental intervention consisted of five one-hour sessions that involved the use of 
different StarLogo simulations: Slime, FreeGas, Wolf-Sheep. Over this period the nine students, 
met individually with the coach and worked with the simulations. Metacognitive prompts were 
provided as needed.  
Data were collected from direct observations (audio and video tapes of the instructional 
activities), written documents (students’ responses at the pretest and posttest, and concept maps), 
and interviews. This data was subsequently used to construct two measures, a measure of the 
students’ explanatory frameworks – Ontological Beliefs measured by (EFMM) –  and a measure 
of the students’ Conceptual Understanding of Complex Systems (CST). 
 
Findings of the Study 
 
The findings were as follows: (1) Although students experienced gains in the of the five 
component features of emergent causal processes, their difficulty with the concepts of “random 
actions” of agents and “nonlinear effects” of agents constrained their deeper understanding of 
emergent causal processes. (2) Although the StarLogo simulations facilitated the acquisition of 
certain aspects of this knowledge, it provided no affordance for learning the concept of 
“nonlinearity”. Furthermore, aspects of these multi-agents representations generated conflicting 
ontological explanations for the concept of “randomness”. (3) Although the selected StarLogoT 
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simulations demonstrated emergent causal processes, they represented different types of complex 
systems (i.e., tightly coupled and dissipative loosely coupled).  Although most students had 
difficulty with the representations of dissipative systems, those who had a more advanced 
understanding of science concepts gained an understanding of emergent causal processes from 
dissipative representations. (4) Conceptual change required metacognitive scaffolding and 
ongoing metaconceptual prompts during the instructional phase. However, once students 
acquired synthetic mental models2, maturation over time and experience with complementary 
domain curricula was sufficient for them to elaborate their understanding of emergent causal 
processes. 
 
Educational Implications 
 
Three main educational implications can be drawn from this study: (1) students exhibited 
ease in acquiring certain components of emergent framework mental models even with a short-
term intervention. Therefore this learning goal may be achievable without major additions to the 
curriculum; (2) there is need for a greater understanding of emergent causal processes by 
curriculum developers (e.g., instructional designers) and teachers (e.g., professional development 
and teacher training programs) so that they are more aware of the many opportunities to apply 
this knowledge. Additionally, until recently there has been a lack of representational tools to 
readily convey emergent processes as demonstrated by complex systems and thereby provide the 
necessary scaffolding for learning these concepts. While these tools are making their way into 
the educational system, there is a need to develop the easily accessible curricula topics that 
demonstrate complex systems behaviors (e.g., respiration, and cardiovascular circulation in the 
health sciences, the behavior of geological and ecological systems in the natural sciences); (3) 
this alternative explanatory framework may be beneficial for all disciplines not just science. If 
students are better able to explain the social, political, and economic interactions they encounter 
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underlying ontological and epistemological presuppositions, which are referred to as “component beliefs” (in 
Jacobson & Archodidou, 2000). 
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with more than a linear perspective they may in fact do a better job of understanding the 
unpredictable, and probabilistic nature of many of these phenomena.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the results of this study provide strong support that the ontological training 
facilitated the creation of emergent framework mental models (EFMMs). The evidence that most 
students acquired at least three of the Complex-Systems concepts supports this conclusion    
The affordances for learning aspects of emergent causal processes offered by the multi-
agent models/simulations are highly related to the type of complex system represented and also 
to the students’ background understanding of science. In particular more students had difficulty 
learning with representations (simulations) of dissipative system complexity compared to those 
using representations of tightly coupled organization models of complexity. 
Conceptual change requires not only robust conceptual representations (e.g., models that 
can be used as analogies) but also metacognitive scaffolding and ongoing metaconceptual 
prompts during the instructional phase. Once initiated (i.e., once synthetic mental models are 
created), maturation over time and experience with complementary domain curricula appear to 
have positive effects on the development of more elaborated emergent framework mental 
models.  
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